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Oh, What a Tangled Web We Weave:
The Implications of Conflicting
Domestic Policy on Arbitrability and
Award Enforcement
BY JENNIFER VINCENT
Perhaps the most attractive reason to submit a dispute to
arbitration is the privacy of the process, and, though courts have
some authority in enforcement or setting aside of awards, courts in
one country may decide to enforce an award that has been set aside
in another. For this reason, many countries have traditionally
shielded from arbitration certain spheres in which strong public
interest would discourage the unpredictability of an arbitration and
have reserved these issues for courts and other more qualified state
authorities. This leads to inconsistency and confusion when dealing
with a dispute between two parties in international arbitration.
There is a prevailing American stereotype which prefers guns to
treaties, personal security to world order, and trial to discourse, but with
the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and supporting Supreme Court
precedent, there is now a trend toward a strong presumption favoring
enforcement of arbitration clauses, even for statutory claims. The Court
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ruled that an
arbitration clause is binding on a party to arbitrate even statutory
claims.' The justices stressed that the subject-matter exclusion
contemplated in Article II of the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NYC) is
solely the jurisdiction of Congress and not the courts.2 The United States
also legislated into the Federal Arbitration Act that foreign awards have
1. Mitisubushi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614,615 (1985).
2. Id. at 639, n.21
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
a presumption of enforcement unless certain elements are met.3
While our neighbors in Europe have a reputation for a much
more amicable relationship with arbitration, especially as the home
of the International Chamber of Commerce, the first international
arbitration tribunal, their statutes and court rulings seem to move in
quite the opposite direction and instead call for non-arbitrability in
issues of diritti disponsibili, or rights which are not disposable, as
seen in Fincantieri v. Minister of Defense, and issues of competition
laws and public policy.4 The Court of Justice of the European
Communities has also ruled that awards should be annulled as a
matter of public policy if such an award would violate community
law.5
Each nation and its legislators traditionally has complete
discretion on defining which issues are arbitrable, and the result is a
hodge-podge of different rules and standards. The New York
Convention impliedly and expressly acknowledges that an
arbitration agreement or award enforcement may be trumped by
non-arbitrability, or public policy needs.6 The UNCITRAL Model
Law even leaves room for each state to define its own terms of
arbitrability.7 This means that for lawyers in a modern world, where
international commercial transactions are the norm, navigating such
a web can be tricky when aiding clients in both constructing
arbitration clauses and dealing with disputes as they arise. Knowing
which court and which jurisdiction to approach when a particular
outcome is sought is a necessity in the modern realm of arbitration.
3. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012); 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
4. Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiani v. Ministry of Defense, 21 Y.B. Comm.
Arb'n 594 (1994).
5. Case C126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton International NV, ECR
1-3055.
6. New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, art.2(1), 2(3), 5(2), June, 10, (1958).
7. UNCITRAL Model Law, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf
/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb/06-54671_Ebook.pdf
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I. Internationally Differing Models For Arbitrability and
Enforcement
Civil law countries tend to rely on legislation to define
arbitrability, and often do so with the lingo of "rights of which one
can dispose freely."8 Arbitrability often hinges on whether or not a
dispute falls under mandatory law, one in which the state's/society's
interest is such that the rules used to establish this purpose cannot be
overridden by an agreement between the parties. Common law states
tend to rely on case law to define arbitrability and come up with a
case-by-case analysis for arbitrability. The European model focuses
largely on disposable rights to determine arbitrability and
enforcement is largely determined by public policy and violation of
non-arbitrability rules. The American Model seems to allow for more
in the way of arbitrability, allowing issues to be sent to arbitration
unless clear Congressional intent is shown to disallow it, and
enforcement has focused on a deferential review of the arbitrators'
decision. Following is a sampling of countries across the globe that
each deals differently with the issue of arbitrability, whether the issue
can even go to arbitration, and enforcement of awards, whether local
courts will acknowledge and enforce the outcome of the arbitration.
A. French "Code Civil" (1804)
The French Code states that parties may arbitrate "with respect
to all rights of which one can dispose freely."9 It also states that "one
cannot submit to arbitration questions of status and capacity of
persons, questions relative to divorce and separation, or questions
respecting controversies that concern public entities or public
establishments and more generally any matter that concerns the
public order."'10
France makes a very general blanket statement regarding non-
arbitrability in saying that one cannot submit to arbitration any
matter that concerns the public order. Public order is not defined, so
8. See, e.g., CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 2059 (Fr.), CODE CIVIL [Rv.] art. 1020(3)
(Neth.). Portuguese 1986 Act on Voluntary Arbitration Article 1(1), CODE CIVIL
[C.P.C.] art. 806 (It.).
9. CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 2059 (Fr.)
10. Id. at art. 2060
2015]
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it could cover all manner of disputes. The French government
intends to cast a wide definition of public order in order to keep a
wide array of issues off the table for arbitration, at the discretion of
the government. By decree, however, arbitration is available if one
can establish a commercial character of an establishment. This is
similar to the Swiss statute's proclamation regarding economic
interests."
On the enforcement end, the French Code states that an "arbitral
award shall be recognized or enforced in France if the party relying
on it can prove its existence and if such recognition or enforcement is
not manifestly contrary to international public policy."12 This shows
a strong presumption of enforcement, but "international public
policy" is still broad enough that it could lead to some troubles when
the arbitration involves countries that are not necessarily political
allies or when it involves issues of mandatory law that arguably
regulate international relationships.
B. Japanese Code of Civil Procedure
The Japan Arbitration Law, Article 13 regarding the effect of
arbitration agreement, states "unless otherwise provided by law, an
arbitration agreement shall be valid only when its subject matter is a
civil dispute that may be resolved by settlement between parties
(excluding that of divorce or separation)."13 Though this statute does
not explicitly say "disposable rights" there is an implication in the
fact that a dispute may only be arbitrable if it may be resolved by
settlement, that there are settlements which may not be resolved in
such a manner; those disputes would be non-civil or those covered
by mandatory law.
In Japan, an "arbitral award (irrespective of whether or not the
place of arbitration is in the territory of Japan" has the same effect as
a final and conclusive judgment of a court in that jurisdiction.14
Enforceability is guaranteed under the Arbitration Law, subject to the
11. Bundesgesetz vom 18. Dezember 1987 uber das Internationale Privatrecht
[IPRG] [Swiss Private International Law Act], Dec. 18, 1987, SR 291, art. 177(1)
12. CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.] art. 1514 (Fr.).
13. MINSOHO (C. CIV. PRO) art. 13 (Japan).
14. Japan Arbitration Law, Article 45, available at: http://japan.kantei.go.jp
/policy/sihou/ arbitrationlaw.pdf
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limitations in Article 45, which are similar to those under Article 5 of
the New York Convention.'5 These reasons include nonenforcement
when the matter was not arbitrable to begin with, the award has been
set aside in the country where arbitration took place, or when the
award is contrary to public policy. This is very much on par with the
general enforcement attitude throughout the world.
16
C. The Netherlands (1986 Version of Code of Civil Procedure)
The Dutch Code sets aside an exception to arbitration and states
that the "arbitration agreement shall not serve to determine legal
consequences of which the parties cannot freely dispose."17 The code
then goes on to define a list of subject matters that may be submitted
to arbitration, including quality of goods, damages, and modifying or
further defining the legal relationship between parties, though this
list is not exhaustive.'8
The Netherlands Civil Code Article 1062 stipulates that an award
can only be enforced after "the President of the District Court with
whose Registry the original of the award shall be deposited by virtue
of article 1058(1), has, in pursuance of a request of one of the parties,
granted leave for enforcement."'9 However, the President can only
deny enforcement when there is no appeal pending or when "the
manner in which it was made is manifestly contrary to public policy
or good morals."20 There is an extra step to enforcement here that
most countries don't have, which may slow the process, but the
stipulated reasons for nonenforcement are very similar to other
countries.
D. Portuguese 1986 Act on Voluntary Arbitration
The Portuguese statute says an arbitration may deal with "any
dispute relating to disposable rights" and that "the State or any other
public legal entities may conclude arbitration agreements if they are
authorized to do so by a special act or if the subject matters of the
15. Id.
16. See information within this paper re: enforcement.
17. CODE CrvIL [Rv.] art. 1020(3) (Neth.).
18. Id. at 1020(4)(a)-(c)
19. Id. at 1062(a).
20. Id. at 1063(a).
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arbitration agreement are disputes regarding a private law matter"
implying that anything concerning a public matter and the state must
be specially authorized to go to arbitration.21
The Portuguese Law on enforcement also adopts rules for non-
enforcement similar to Article 5 of the NYC.22 This is in line with the
international trend on the treatment of enforcement.
E. Italian Code of Civil Procedure (1990 as Amended in 2006)
The Italian Code states that disputes may go into arbitration if
they do not "concern rights that may not be disposed of, except in
case of express prohibition by law."23 The code also limits arbitration
in cases of express prohibition by law.
An Italian case, which demonstrates rights which are not
disposable, or "diritti indisponibili," and how courts should consider
arbitral jurisdiction, is the Fincantieri v. Ministry of Defense case, in
which Italian shipbuilders entered into contract with the Ministry of
Defense in the Republic of Iraq.24 When the United Nations Security
Council declared an embargo on Iraq and the European Union and
Italy issued embargo legislation, the Italian shipbuilders brought suit
for frustration of contract, claiming that the issues at hand could not
be submitted to arbitration because they were not free to dispose of
the contractual rights.25 The final judgment from the Court of Appeal
from Genoa was that arbitration was impossible not only when it
brings about a result that is forbidden by the law, but courts must
look at jurisdiction "in abstracto" in light of all possible outcomes, so
only courts will have jurisdiction when deciding such an issue.26 The
Italian court takes a conservative view on arbitrability, and
completely removes this dispute from arbitration. However, issues
of competition law have been treated differently than the contract
rights brought forth in this case, showing that Italian law places
antitrust matters lower on the scale of mandatory law than issues
regarding international decrees from the UN, as they reasonably
21. Portuguese 1986 Act on Voluntary Arbitration Article 1(1) and 1(4)
22. Id. at 56.
23. CODE CVL [C.P.c.] art. 806 (It.).
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should.
In 1993, in Coveme SpA (Italy) v. Compagnie Francaise des Isolants
SA (France), the Court of Appeal of Bologna determined that matters
of antitrust are arbitrable under Italian law, in sync with many other
European courts and the Supreme Court of the United States.27 The
court stated that, in accordance with a recent United States Supreme
Court case, in order for an arbitration clause involving issues of diritti
indisponibili to be null and void, the contract containing the
arbitration clause must "affect the diritti indisponibili by transferring,
waiving them, etc [sic], thereby disposing of them in violation of
law."28
The Italian law on arbitration calls for the party seeking
enforcement o, similarly to the Netherlands, "file a petition with the
President of the Court of Appeal of the district in which the other
party has its domicile; if that party has no domicile in Italy, the Court
of Appeal of Rome shall have jurisdiction."29 The only two reasons
for which the President may refuse enforcement are that the subject
is not arbitrable or the enforcement would be contrary to public
policy.30 However, the Court of Appeal may deny enforcement for
reasons similar to Article 5 of NYC.31
F. Swiss Private International Law Act
The Swiss Act, under article 177(1) states that "any dispute
involving economic interest may be the subject matter of arbitration"
and in 177(2) says that a state party "cannot rely on its own law in
order to contest its capacity to be a party to an arbitration or the
arbitrability of a dispute covered by the arbitration agreement."32
This is significantly different from most of the statutes
mentioned above in that it leaves arbitration openly available with a
presumption for arbitrability. While other statutes say arbitration
may not occur in certain situations (those dealing with state parties
27. Coveme v. Compagnie Francaise des Isolants, 18 Y.B. Comm. Arb. (1993).
28. Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055.
29. CODE CIVIL [C.P.C.] art. 839 (It.). CODE CIVIL [Rv] art. 1062(a) (Neth.).
30. CODE CIVIL [C.P.c.] art. 839 (It.).
31. Id. at art. 839.
32. Swiss Private International Law Act, art. 177.
2015]
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or rights not freely disposable) or may occur in situations where
rights are freely disposable, the Swiss statute takes the opposite
perspective and says that arbitration will occur in any case where
there is an economic interest and specifically bars states from
excusing themselves from arbitration based on their own laws. The
Swiss statute is much friendlier to international arbitration and
arbitration in general as it cuts into the rights of the sovereign and
parties of such while other statutes cut out specific rights for state
parties.
Under Swiss law, the recognition and enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards is completely governed by the New York
Convention.33
G. United States Federal Arbitration Act
Common law jurisdictions have developed case law to define the
standards of arbitrability. The United States has done the same, using
court decisions and following legislation to fill in the gaps left by the
Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention. The Federal
Arbitration Act, enacted by Congress in 1925, is the starting point for
arbitration guidelines in the United States for disputes involving
interstate commerce, based on Congress' right to regulate via the
Commerce Clause. Section 2 of the FAA states that arbitration
agreements will be enforced unless they are invalid "upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract."34
In other words, an arbitration agreement will stand unless the clause
itself is considered void or inoperable under some principle of
contract law like unconscionability or duress. Unlike the previous
statutes from European countries, the United States statute sets aside
no limit to arbitration based on public policy or mandatory law and,
instead, leaves it to case law to make cut-outs and definitions. The
Supreme Court ruled in Southland Corp. v. Keating that the FAA is
applicable to contracts under state law as well.35
This means that the Federal Arbitration Act and enforcement of
arbitration clauses will preempt a state law which is unlikely to
33. Id. at 194, available at: https://www.swissarbitration.org/sa/download
/IPRG-english.pdf
34. Federal Arbitration Act § 2.
35. Southland Corp v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 1 (1984).
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enforce the clause; the Supreme Court of the United States further
promulgated this in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion when they ruled the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts "state-law rules that stand as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA's objectives."36 There are
a few exceptions to preemption, discussed here. The Financial
Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA, the SEC-run successor to the
NASD, has rules stating arbitration must occur through a FINRA
arbitration panel) Rule 2268 and 12204 state that customer (investor)
class action suits may not be arbitrated, and the arbitration agreement
is nullified until the class certification is denied, the class is
decertified, a member is excluded from the class or a member elects
not to participate, at which the time the arbitration clause is
enforceable against either the un-certified class or the
nonparticipating member.37 Also, the California Health and Safety
Code § 1361.1, which gives explicit directions for an arbitration clause
in order for it to be valid, is only partially preempted. The Supreme
Court ruled in Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson that
State courts may, in accordance with the FAA, decline to enforce
arbitration clauses on the basis of generally applicable contract
defenses, but may not do so on the basis of state laws only applicable
to arbitration provisions, as this puts the arbitration agreement on a
different footing from regular contracts, contrary to Congressional
intent per Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. (equal footing of arbitration
contracts and regular contracts)- 38
These cases show the Supreme Court's support of the Federal
Arbitration Act's presumption for arbitration. Similarly, Congress'
support of the FINRA rules shows that the United States values class
action suits in securities regulation so highly in that these disputes
are not sent to arbitration but resolved in court, where they can be
appealed in case of a mistake. However, in the trend of arbitrability
expansion in the late 1900s to early 2000s, the Supreme Court ruled in
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth to allow international
arbitration of an issue regarding violation of an American statute
(United States mandatory law on antitrust claims, a violation of the
36. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740, 1743 (2011).
37. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, rule 2268 and 12204 (2007).
38. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1361.1; Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 265 (1995); Sherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974).
20151
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Sherman Act), a ruling which admitted that "a contrary result would
be forthcoming in a domestic context" and excused this in favor of
"concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution
of disputes."39 The Court in Mitsubishi also ruled "Congress may
specify categories or claims it wishes to reserve for decisions by our
own courts without contravening this Nation's obligations under the
Convention."40
In 2002, after much lobbying by the automobile industry due to
their anger at the perceived loss of the rights included in the
"Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act," Congress created the first
exception to the Federal Arbitration Act with the "Motor Vehicle
Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act" in order to prohibit
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the motor vehicle
industry. However, this act has now been construed very narrowly
by courts, so what seemed like a big win for domestic law is being
whittled down as courts emphasize the presumption of arbitrability
coming about with modern commercial relationships.41
On top of the United States favoring the entrance into arbitration
of a wide variety of issues, the United States' stance on enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards is also generous. Congress passed 9 U.S.C.
§207 stating that a "court shall confirm the award unless it finds one
of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement
specified in the said Convention."42 The Convention sets a very high
standard for courts to vacate an award and shows support for the
purposes and goals of the Convention of a pro-enforcement.43
II. Consequences of Different Standards
Despite different nations defining non-arbitrability in their own
39. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
40. Id. at 639, n.21.
41. Christopher Geneovese & Erik T. Norton, The Motor Vehicle Franchise
Agreement Arbitration Fairness Act (2010), available at http://www.
nelsonmullins.com/DocumentDepot/MotorVehicleFranchiseAgreementArbitr
ationFairnessAct 4.5.10.pdf
42. Federal Arbitration Act § 10 & § 207.
43. Id.
[Vol. 38:1
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ways and enforcing awards based on their own laws, the major trend
internationally is to limit the doctrine of non-arbitrability, especially
in the area of international arbitrations, in order to maintain order
and predictability in the international commercial system.
Problems are unavoidable, though, when certain countries have
different standards of arbitrability and enforcement because
arbitration inherently allows some forum shopping. If the agreement
between parties is not completely clear, with unambiguity being a
very rare occurrence to begin, the two parties can take the dispute to
different courts or tribunals and get different jurisdictional rulings on
which law should apply to arbitrability. Also, even if the agreement
is very clear, a party could still take the agreement to the courts in
their State and obtain a ruling of nonenforcement because of non-
arbitrability, which leads to interference with resolution of cross-
border disputes.
A. Arbitrability - "First Look"
Despite the general sentiment that Mitsubishi was a huge win for
arbitration and would cause a great increase in international
arbitration, there was some concern regarding footnote 19 of the
Mitsubishi case. The footnote states that the antitrust claims raised
should (and based on the ICC's Amicus Curiae, likely would) be
decided under United States law despite the choice-of-law clause that
provided the agreement "will be governed by and construed in all
respects according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if
entirely performed therein."44 The concern was that Mitsubishi would
cost more to international arbitration than what it gave because
United States substantive law would be forced upon parties to
arbitration, or United States courts would deny enforcement of
awards given, contrary to United States mandatory law.45
In its amicus brief for Mitsubishi, the International Chamber of
Commerce suggested that:
"According to leading German and French authorities, there is a
growing tendency of international arbitrators to take into account the
antitrust laws and other mandatory legal rules expressing public
44. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 652, n.19.
45. Werner, 3 J. INT'l ARB. 81 (1986).
2015]
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policy enacted by a state that has a significant relationship to the facts
of the case, even though the state's law does not govern the contract
by virtue of the parties' choice or applicable conflict rules."
46
Buhler and Webster reiterated this view in their Handbook of ICC
Arbitration, when they said that "whatever the rules of law applicable
to the dispute, if an agreement has effect in a given country, then, in
many countries, the competition law principles of that country are
applicable." This is consistent with an American Supreme Court case in
which the ruling developed an "effects" test for the extraterritorial
application of American antitrust laws.47 This idea of extraterritoriality
was recently confirmed in another Supreme Court case, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank, Ltd., in which the court ruled that to determine
the extraterritorial application of a federal statute, one must determine
the focus of the statute, and, in the case of antitrust legislation, the focus
of the statute is to prevent price-fixing within the territory of the United
States.48 This shows that American jurisprudence has a finger on the
pulse of the international trend that allows the application of law outside
the parties' choice if that country is the one suffering from the effects of
the antitrust violation. This can also be seen in the course of European
Union litigation where the European Union Court of Justice ruled that
the EU anti-competition rules could apply extraterritorially on the basis
of effects within the EU.49 Derains and Schwartz also commented on this
trend when they wrote in their "Guide to ICC Rules of Arbitration" that
parties' rights to select the governing law is not unlimited.50 However,
they couched this in the reality that the recent rend of courts in both the
United States and the European Union is to recognize anticompetition
claims as arbitrable, which means that countries are looking at the
modem trend of applying something like an effect test and, based on
such general practice, allowing these issues to go to arbitration with the
faith that they will be handled correctly, even in such places as France
and Belgium where matters of public policy were "considered to be non-
46. GORDON BLANKE & PHILIP LANDOLT, EU AND US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 1782 (Kluwer Law 2011).
47. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
48. Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd, 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
49. Case 89/85, Ahlstrorn Osakeyhtib v. Comm'n, 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
50. MICHAEL BUHLER & THOMAS WEBSTER, HANDBOOK OF ICC ARBITRATION:
COMMENTARY, PRECEDENTS, MATERIALS (3rd ed. 2008).
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arbitrable."51
B. Enforceability - Stage Three "Second Look"
Buhler and Webster, in their "Handbook of ICC Arbitration" also
discussed the idea that because arbitrators can apply rules of law that
are not the parties' choice, the enforcement of the award can be
refused in another country if it goes against "the law of the country
in which the effects of the relevant contract are felt."52 This is actually
a common outcome for arbitration awards, as can be seen in Eco Swiss
China Time Ltd v. Benetton International NV.53
In Eco Swiss, the court looks at arbitrability from the "second
look" stage during the award enforcement stage. Arising under
European Union law, the case involves a motion to annul a Dutch
domestic award in the Netherlands.4 Benetton was ordered to pay
damages to Eco Swiss for a breach of an agreement, but the agreement
was potentially in violation of European Union competition laws.55
However, neither party brought up the anticompetition complaints
during the arbitration, so the Dutch court asked the Court of Justice
of the European Communities whether European Law, which
applied to the Netherlands, should apply to the case at hand such that
the Dutch court should annul the award, or if the law was no longer
applicable because it had not been raised during the arbitration.5 6
Applying community law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
ultimately ruled that the domestic court must grant an application for
annulment of the award when it violates European Union antitrust
law (Article 81 EC), even if an award violating Dutch antitrust law
would not have amounted to a public policy issue large enough to do
so.5 7 The European Union places anticompetition laws highly in their
priorities for public policy concerns because it "constitutes a
fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of
51. Id.; Yves Derains & Eric A. Schwartz, Guide to ICC Rules of Arbitration (2nd
ed. 2005).
52. Buhler, supra note 38.
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the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the
functioning of the internal market."5 8 The ECJ later held, in 2006 in
Manfredi, Cannito, Tricorico & Murgolo v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni
SpA, Fondiaria Sai SpA & Assitalia SpA that "Article 81 EC and 82 EC
are a matter of public policy which must be automatically applied by
national courts," proving it was such a high priority that they wanted
those provisions applied, not only in the case of arbitration award
enforcement or annulment, but also in all national courts as a general
rule of law in the name of public order.59 This asks courts to take a
less deferential "second look" at issues of competition law in the
European Union.
This demonstrates the ECJ's similar thinking to the kind the
United States displays in the Mitsubishi case. While Mitsubishi
discusses arbitrability in the framework of whether it is a "subject
matter capable of settlement by arbitration,"60 it merely allows
statutory claims, except those expressly prohibited by Congress, to go
to arbitration and does not make any promises regarding the
enforcement of such awards as may violate antitrust law.61 Footnote
19 of the Mitsubishi ruling was especially interpreted by some to say
that the United States actually may not enforce an award which
violated United States antitrust law, or under which United States
substantive law was not applied to a statutory or mandatory law
claim.62 In comparison, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, in Manfredi, is highlighting an issue of public order/
public policy during the enforcement stage and making it incumbent
upon courts to annul an award when this issue is violated.63 The
Manfredi ruling was based on a completely different part of the New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
58. Id.
59. Manfredi, Cannito, Tricorico & Murgolo v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni
SpA, Fondiaria Sai SpA & Assitalia SpA Joined Cases C-295-98/04, [2006] E.C.R. 1-
6619, P 31, available at page 6 of http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=2113&context=ilj
60. NYC, supra note 6, at art.II(1)/
61. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 615.
62. See e.g. Werner, supra note 32
63. See, e.g., Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055.
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Arbitral Awards -the Article V recognition rules.64
The two cases operate at very different stages and may not affect
one another in practice, but they still demonstrate a very important
consequence of differing standards of arbitrability on an international
scale. Mitsubishi and Manfredi are unlikely to run into one another in
application to any one case because they operate under two different
parts of the NYC, but together they demonstrate the importance that
domestic law, in countries across the world, places on anti-
competition law and the unwillingness to forego application of their
own laws when their territory is involved in the transaction. Though
Article II and Article V of the NYC operate at different stages, there
is some overlap in that Article V paragraph 2(a) which states that
recognition and enforcement may be refused "if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought
finds that: (a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country."65 This
means that if a dispute involving an American company and a claim
based on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the motor
vehicle industry (a Congressionally approved exception to the FAA)
went to arbitration in another country and the other party sought
enforcement in a United States court, that court would refuse
enforcement on the grounds that the subject was not capable of
settlement by arbitration under Article V of the NYC and the
exception to the FAA.66 If the same case went to an American court
at a stage before arbitration when the court was determining its
jurisdiction over the case, the court would not send the case to
arbitration at all, but this would fall under Article II of the NYC.67
In Baxter International, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, the 7th Circuit
looked at a case from the "second look" point of view as in Eco Swiss
and Manfredi, and made a decision on enforceability and the level of
deference with which a court should review an arbitral award
involving United States antitrust law.68 Baxter exclusively licensed
use of a one-step process for making anesthetic to Marushi; Marushi
64. NYC, supra note 6, at art.V(2)(b).
65. NYC, supra note 6, at art. V-2(a).
66. Id.
67. Id. at art.II (1)
68. See, e.g., Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 315 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2003).
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is a Japanese company operating in Japanese markets, so Marushi
sub-licensed the process to Abbott for production and marketing in
the United States (the contract for which contained an arbitration
clause), and Abbott incurred high costs to obtain FDA approval,
which approves the process for all producers.69 Another company,
Ohmeda, successfully came up with a three step process; Baxter
acquired them and started to market and produce, so Abbott started
arbitral proceedings seeking an award to stop Baxter from producing
in competition with them.70 The arbitral panel, composed of a
Spanish attorney, a Japanese law professor, and an American
attorney, decided that Baxter was barred from competing with
Abbott until the one-step patent expired in 2006, and this was not a
violation of United States antitrust laws (the American lawyer
dissented).7 Baxter then brought a claim to the 7th Circuit, which
confirmed the award.72
The 7th circuit claimed that Baxter lacked the right to reargue an
issue that an arbitration award had already settled, and stated "a
mistake of law is not a ground on which to set aside an award" citing
the Federal Arbitration Act Section 207 which states "the court shall
confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award" specified in the
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards.73 The court even went so far as to say that
the Court in Mitsubishi "did not contemplate that, once arbitration
was over, the federal courts would throw the result in the waste
basket and litigate the antitrust issues anew" and cited the
international comity reasoning behind the ruling.74 The 7th Circuit
cited Mitsubishi as saying the standard for review would be making
sure "the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually
decided them."75 There was a scathing dissent to this case that posits
from now on, if an arbitral tribunal commands a party to violate the
69. Id. at 830-31
70. Id. at 831
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.; 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
74. Baxter, 315 F.3d at 832.
75. Id.
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Sherman Act, courts no longer have the power to intervene.76
The 7th Circuit erred here, with troubling consequences. The
Mitsubishi Court did not mean for all arbitration awards regarding
antitrust violations to stand simply because the tribunal addressed
the antitrust issue. In Mitsubishi the justices declined to speculate on
the enforcement stage, but the fact that they made a point of having
American substantive law applied to the claim in footnote 19 and the
standard of review mentioned of "cognizance" show a wish that
American substantive law be applied, and the Court would not care
about law being applied if they did not wish for it to be applied
correctly. The Court even said that "[h]aving permitted the
arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United States will
have an opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that
the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has
been addressed."77 It is significant here that the American attorney
on the arbitration panel for Baxter dissented on the opinion that "such
an ancillary restraint to give Abbott an incentive to invest in FDA
approval was not a violation of U.S. antitrust law."78 This shows there
is a high possibility the tribunal misapplied U.S. substantive law, and
that while "cognizant" of the antitrust claim, the tribunal did not
"actually decide them" under American law, but under a more
lenient standard. While Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental
Casualty Co. et al. was cited by the court as saying arbitrators have
"free reign to decide the law as well as the facts and are not subject to
appellate review," they used this ruling incorrectly because arbitral
decisions are subject o at least a small level of appellate review as a
tenet of the process of arbitration.79 All arbitral awards must be either
enforced or vacated by a court of law, which requires some review of
the award; this means that the Commonwealth Coatings quote should
be taken as dicta in emphasizing the importance of scrupulously
choosing impartial arbitrators.
Baxter's argument is not just another way to say that antitrust
claims are not arbitrable because Baxter is saying that antitrust law
was applied incorrectly in finding no violation in his case, not that all
76. See, e.g., Baxter, 315 F.3d at 833-39.
77. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
78. Baxter, 315 F.3d at 831.
79. Id.
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antitrust claims should come out this way or that the panel did not
use American law or had no right to do so.80 Though deference to
arbitral tribunals is necessary to the process, some amount of
substantive review is necessary to make sure the arbitrators are doing
their jobs correctly when dealing with issues of mandatory or
statutory law. On public policy grounds, the court should review
claims that American law was applied incorrectly when in reference
to mandatory law. While in Wilko v. Swan the Supreme Court ruled
that an award based on "manifest disregard" of law will not be
enforced81, that is with the assumption that manifest disregard of the
law requires "something beyond and different from a mere error in
the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply
the law."82 A less deferential review of matters of mandatory/
statutory law will not go against this ruling, as it is not in reference to
statutory law or a law which on public policy grounds should be
closely scrutinized. Setting aside the award here would not offend
international comity, and the public policy repercussions of allowing
an award like this could be extremely damaging to the United States
economy. Allowing parties to contract in violation of United States
statutory law and then have an arbitral tribunal approve it (while
claiming to apply U.S. law) without a true review by an American
court, will be damaging to the commerce system and lead to rampant
violations and arbitration clauses which shield companies from
litigation. The Mitsubishi Court, in their ruling, made a decision based
on international comity, but it is doubtful it was under the impression
that their ruling would later be used to disallow court review of such
issues. Making antitrust law arbitrable does not automatically bring
it down to the level of contract law; it merely submits it to the purview
of arbitration and an award from such, which must be approved by a
court. Perhaps the United States court in Baxter was so eager to move
away from the noncompliant international reputation of the nation
they slipped on protecting domestic issues.
80. Id.
81. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 436, 440 (1953).
82. San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d
796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961).
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C. What Happens with Enforcement
Because of the differing standards of award enforcement, it can
be difficult for parties to predict where an award will be enforced and
where it will be annulled. The following cases show the confusion of
courts in different countries, with different review standards and
policies, ruling on the same arbitral award.
In SNF v. Cytec, the Cour de Cassation ruled that a foreign award
(Belgian) potentially violating European Union antitrust law would
still be enforced in France unless there was a showing that the
arbitrators "flagrantly" violated EU competition laws.8 3 (This is very
similar to the "manifest disregard" standard suggested by some
American courts.)84 The Cour de Cassation made this ruling in light
of the French Civil Procedure Article 1520(5) which states that an
award may be set aside "if the recognition or enforcement are
contrary to international public policy" and claimed there was only
an international public policy violation if such violation is
"flagrant."85 Concurrently, the Belgian Court of First Instance ruled
to set the award aside using a much more lenient definition of a
public policy violation.86 However, if the award is enforceable under
the French Civil code, it is still enforceable in France despite the fact
that it was annulled in a court in the same country where the award
was made.87 This demonstrates a deferential "second look" at the
award and says that if it fits within the realm of enforcement in a
country, it will be enforced there.
In the case X (SpA) v. Y (Srl), the Federal Supreme Court of
Switzerland enforced a Swiss award that allegedly violated European
Union competition law while admitting the difficulty of judging what
makes an issue subject o annulment under "public policy." 88 The
Court stated that the public policy concerned fundamental values,
viewed not only from the perspective of an international level, but
83. Socit6 SNF (SNF) v. Soci~ts Cytec (Cytec), Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme
court for judicial matters], le civ., June 4, 2008, Bull. civ I, No. 06-15320, (Fr.).




88. X (SpA) v. Y (Sri), Budesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] March 8,
2006, 132 Entscheidungen des Schweirzerischen Budesgerichts [BGE] 11389 (Switz.)
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also a domestic level in Switzerland (not a member of the European
Union), and then concluded that, in Community law, competition
law was not "essential and widely recognized" as a value that
"should constitute the foundation of all legal orders."89 Thus,
submitting, once more, competition law to arbitrability and using a
deferential "second look" at an award to allow enforcement.
Though the consequences of the different standards can lead to
different enforcement in different countries, the trend of countries to
take a deferential second look is helping promote the purposes of the
NYC in creating an arbitration system that is consistent
internationally. Because an international trend emerged recently in
favor of enforcement, it encourages other countries to follow suit,
some even with reciprocity agreements. These agreements are
bilateral agreements saying that if an arbitration award in one
country would be enforced in the second, then the first country will
also enforce an award by the second. Though these agreements are
helpful in gaining recognition for the issue of enforcement, they may
not be the best mechanism because political considerations will start
to come into play in a "tit for tat" exchange of enforcement. To best
promote the purposes of the NYC, a policy in favor of enforcement
with deferential review will encourage enforcement and
predictability in international commercial transactions.
III. The Remedy to Differing Standards is Partial
Deferential Review
Calling for non-arbitrability of certain issues inherently
demonstrates distrust in the capacity of the arbitrators, or an entire
arbitration system, to properly resolve disputes in those areas. Such
skepticism is reasonable when consideration is paid to the fact that
arbitrators do not have to be trained lawyers; arbitrators are hired by
one party to make a decision based on the agreement between two
non-state parties, and the system of arbitration is generally not open
to review by courts or state actors to catch and correct any mistakes
that arbitrators may make. The remedy to the arbitrability issue
seems to be mostly solved through arbitrators using the law that
applies to the validity of the arbitration agreement itself for
89. Id.
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determining the arbitrability issue. However, this still leads to the
issue of enforcement of the award that may come from such a
decision. A problem also still remains in enforcing foreign awards in
general because the NYC allows for public policy considerations to
defeat an award.90
In M.S.A. (Belgium) v. Company M (Switzerland) the Court of
Appeal in Brussels ruled upon the problem of arbitrability and the
law applicable to its determination.91 The two companies entered
into an agreement for an exclusive distributorship that was covered
by an arbitration agreement calling for application of Swiss law.92
After a dispute, M.S.A took a claim to the Court of First Instance of
Brussels which ruled the arbitration agreement was null and void
under Article 11(1) of the NYC because it concerned a matter which
was not subject to arbitration under the laws of Belgium.93 Company
M appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed the Court of First
Instance.94 The Court of Appeal emphasized that "the arbitrability of
a dispute must be ascertained according to different criteria,
depending on whether the question arises when deciding on the
validity of the arbitration agreement or when deciding on the
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award."95 If the question
arises when determining the validity of the arbitration agreement, the
law governing the validity of such agreement will govern
determinations of arbitrability, so the Court of First Instance erred in
applying Belgian law to the arbitration agreement when Swiss law
was clearly called for in the agreement.96 The Court of Appeals also
ruled that Article II(1) "does not affect the applicability of the law
designated by the uniform solution of conflict of laws for deciding on
the arbitrability of the dispute at the level of the arbitration
90. NYC, supra note 6, at art.V(2)(b)
91. Belgium No. 6, Cour d'appel [Court of Appeal] of Brussels, Not Indicated, 4






96. Company M, supra note 91.
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agreement."97 They also stated that, under the NYC, the law of the
forum regarding arbitrability need only be considered when looking
at recognition or enforcement of the award because most awards are
carried out without enforcement by a court, so it saves time in the
process.98 By leaving the issue of arbitrability under different laws to
the stage of enforcement, the Court of Appeals of Brussels hoped to
mainstream the process of arbitration and leave more complicated
decision-making to later in the process when a number of cases have
been closed out already.
Similar issues were dealt with in Consulant (France) v. Egyptian
Local Authority where the agreement provided for arbitration in
Geneva under the ICC Rules and also stated that "Egyptian laws will
be applicable" in a different clause.99 The Egyptian party claimed the
issue was not arbitrable because under Egyptian law this was an
administrative contract and therefore not arbitrable.100 The arbitrator
decided that, as the seat of the arbitration, Swiss law would apply to
determination of arbitrability.101 As the agreement was not entirely
clear, it is well within the purview of the arbitrator to decide which
law will apply, and under the application of Swiss law, the claim was
arbitrable. This is still consistent with the Company M case because it
uses the law which the arbitrator ruled was applicable to the
agreement o determine the arbitrability, as is called for in that case.
These two cases show the difficulty in actual application of
determining arbitrability when the national laws of parties differ.
In Parsons & Whittemeore Overseas Co v. Societe Generale de
L'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), the court addressed the kind of
consequences that come about with different standards and the battle
between domestic law and deference in enforcement of an arbitral
award.102 The Southern District Court of New York granted summary
judgment to confirm an arbitral award holding Overseas liable to
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Consultant v. Egyptian Local Authority, Final Award, ICC Case No. 6162,
1990, 17 Y.B. Com. Arb. 153 (1992)
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale De L'Industrie Du
Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974)
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RAKTA for breach of contract (when it pulled out of the contract due
to political support for decisions of the United States government in
withdrawing funding from Overseas' project when Egypt grew
hostile to Americans), and Overseas appealed it to the 2nd Circuit
United States Court of Appeals.103 The grounds of the appeal,
defenses derived expressly from the NYC and one implied from it,
were the main focus of the 2nd Circuit opinion in affirming the
district court's confirmation of the foreign award.104 The defenses are
as follows:
"enforcement of the award would violate the public policy of the
United States, the award represents an arbitration of matters not
appropriately decided by arbitration; ... the award is predicated
upon a resolution of issues outside the scope of contractual
agreement o submit to arbitration; and the award is in manifest
disregard of law."10 5
The court pointed out that the New York Convention "shifted
the burden of proof to the party defending against enforcement and
limited his defenses to seven set forth in Article V."106
In addressing the public policy issue, the court ruled that the
history of the Convention, and the pro-enforcement bias under which
it was brought to life, should be interpreted to narrow this defense
from its previous status under the Geneva Convention, so awards
may only be denied enforcement when they "would violate the forum
state's most basic notions of morality and justice."10 7 There is no
violation of public policy here because there is no justification under
the Convention's purpose to equate national policy with public policy
in general. 08 In addressing the non-arbitrability argument the court
ruled that the "mere fact that an issue of national interest may
incidentally figure into the resolution of a breach of contract claim
does not make the dispute not arbitrable," and this is especially true
considering the following ruling in Mitsubishi.109 The NYC Article
103. Id. at 971.
104. Id. at 972.
105. Id. at 972- 73.
106. Id. at 973.
107. Parsons, supra note 89, at 974
108. Id.
109. Id. at 975.
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(V)(1)(c) defense of arbitration outside of jurisdiction will prevail if
the objector proves "[t]he award deals with a difference not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of
the submission to arbitration," and in the FAA 10(a)(4) an award may
be overturned if arbitrators exceed their powers.11° The court says
this should also be construed narrowly and with a powerful
presumption that arbitrators acted within the realm of their authority,
as supported by the purpose of the Convention and United States
precedent."' On this defense, the 2nd Circuit ruled against Overseas
that it is "not apparent" arbitrators exceeded the scope of the
submission because they took the contract provisions into account
and decided they had jurisdiction over them; also, by seeking to have
the court review the structure of the contract found by the tribunal,
Overseas is overlooking the inconsistency of this action with the
general deference, and precedent for such, given to arbitral
tribunals.11 2 Finally, the defense of "manifest disregard of law" which
Overseas implied from the Convention was rejected, even though the
court declined to decide if this defense itself was actually valid,
because even if it were valid it would still not be tenable under the
theory that Overseas "asks this court to read this defense as a license
to review the record of arbitral proceedings for errors of fact or law-
a role which we have emphatically declined to assume in the past and
reject once again."113
The United States, here, gives great deference to the foreign
award, citing the overarching principles of the NYC as pushing the
world at large toward a pro-enforcement bias. A ruling like this,
which grants great deference to awards, even possibly in the face of
"manifest disregard of law," may be a remedy to the consequences
which flow from different standards of arbitrability and enforcement,
but may also create problems with enforcement contrary to domestic
law.
The United States 2nd Circuit addressed the standards applied
to enforceability review of an arbitral award in YusefAhmed.Alghanim
110. Id. at 976.
111. Id. at 976
112. Parsons, supra note 89, at 976
113. Id. at 977.
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& Sons v. Toys "R" Us when they ruled that depending on the court
where enforcement is sought, the standards for nonrecognition
differ.114 If a court in the issuing country of the award is asked to set
aside the award, they may use any grounds for setting aside under
both domestic and international law.115 This ruling is supported by
the NYC Article V(1)(e) which states that the country in which
enforcement may be sought, may set aside the award if it "has been
set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made."1 6
However, if a court in the place where enforcement is sought is asked
to enforce, they may set aside an award exclusively by the grounds
listed in Article V of the NYC." 7
In Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, the 2nd Circuit stated
the review of arbitral awards is 'very limited ... in order to avoid
undermining the twin goals of arbitration, namely, settling disputes
efficiently and avoiding long and expensive litigation."118 This is true
to a certain degree, but are the policy considerations of international
comity really enough to justify awards disregarding domestic law to
go into enforcement? The way the Baxter court rules makes it likely
that parties will contract around anticompetition rules and when the
violating award comes back to the United States for enforcement,
courts will have no choice but to enforce it unless they can show
manifest disregard for the law - apparently, a very high standard to
meet. A deferential standard of review on arbitral awards is a way to
create some predictability in international commercial transactions,
and instating a substantive review on statutory claims dealt with in
the award is not necessarily contrary to that purpose, but is bound to
cause some hiccups in the system when it comes to enforcement.
However, there seems to be no way to enforce, on an
international scale, the degree of deference courts must show foreign
awards or the standards by which they review such awards (in terms
of domestic or international law) unless it is added into the
114. Yusef Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, 126 F.3d 15,23 (2d Cir. 1997).
115. Id. at 23
116. NYC, supra note 6, at art. V(1)(e)
117. Yusef Ahmed, 126 F.3d at 23.
118. Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 111 (2nd Cir. 1993).
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Convention. This is unlikely simply because nations are unlikely to
submit their own courts to the jurisdiction of a rule by the
international community, the international community already has
trouble in getting countries to interact with each other in accordance
with signed treaties or to obey sanctions handed down by the
International Court of Justice. In diplomacy as well as commerce,
there are still domestic issues which take precedence over
international ones, as seen by the legislated exceptions to the New
York Convention, the Federal Arbitration Act, and the court rulings
which aid in deciphering arbitrability and enforceability within each
state.
The "patchwork" structure at present is the only system that
maintains national autonomy across borders. While the New York
Convention seeks to encourage international arbitration by creating a
general set of standards, it makes sure to point out that countries are
free to make reservations to the Convention by legislating or setting
aside issues which, in a particular nation, may not be subject to
arbitration or where an award regarding such issues may not obtain
recognition. A substantive review over statutory claims in an arbitral
award would be one way to get more countries to submit issues of
public policy to arbitration and to allow for streamlining the
commercial industry as far as dispute resolution. Also, substantive
review of statutory claims would not get in the way of international
comity or an international system any more than the current
hesitations that countries have in sending disputes to arbitration in
the first place. It would create some lag on the back end of the
arbitration process because it would take longer to enforce, but that
slight delay may be worth it when you consider that less awards will
go through a fight for enforcement than a fight to get to an arbitral
tribunal. While a deferential review of an award is a good way to
keep the enforcement process amicable among nations, substantive
review of statutory/mandatory domestic law claims will help
maintain the autonomy of nations and disallow private parties from
contracting around domestic mandatory law without courts having
to pull the "public policy" card. It would also ensure proper
application of domestic law more than mere "cognizance" as
referenced in Baxter."19
119. Baxter, 315 F.3d at 831 (where "cognizance" seems to be merely realizing that
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In International Law it is important to know that since there is no
greater international body of law to enforce, countries are left to
operate on the principles of comity and reciprocity. A question which
must be asked is as follows: Is it better to have a strict convention law
which allows for no reservations so the countries that sign it know
exactly how issues will be treated and know exactly what awards
they must enforce, or is it better to have looser standards which
would encourage more states to participate in such a treaty? In a
human rights treaty, the latter seems preferable because human rights
are so important to the world as a whole that getting countries to join
an agreement o refrain from genocide and cruelty with only slight
reservations is much more important than restricting state entrance
and having no promise or bond with the countries wishing to make
an administrative objection to part of the treaty. The follow-up
question to this, then, is: How important is international arbitration
to the world as a whole? While some may say it is not greatly
important because there are still courts that may do these jobs, others
would argue that arbitration, as a process, is a much better option for
the commercial industry because it allows parties to keep their
process private and goes much more quickly. Arbitration is a
necessary forum for resolution of disputes in international commerce
because there is no "head international court" which may make
enforceable rulings against parties and in the end. In international
adjudication, parties and states are free to do as they wish and simply
bear the consequences of the way other countries react to them.
In the end, there is no right answer to the question of restrictive
code with fewer signatories versus lenient code with high
participation because, in the legal realm, the importance always lies
in the grey, and nuance and fairness lie in interwoven rules and
principles. Nations must be left to navigate the web of international
arbitration to the best of their abilities, and as Montesquieu said, "do
to one another in peace, the most good, and in war, the least evil
possible."
U.S. law should apply).
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